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THE FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (FRLTA)l is
the culnination of several years of effort to accomplish revision of
Florida's landlord-tenant law. It is part of a growing nationwide trend,
both judicial2 and legislative,? toward reforming outdated principles
governing the landlord-tenant relationship.
Under the joint sponsorship of the American Bar Foundation and
the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code was drafted in 1969.4 The
main purpose of this recommendation was to stimulate discussion of
the reform of landlord-tenant law through the comprehensive revision,
* Member, Florida Bar. Reporter for the Florida Law Revision Council's landlord-
tenant project, 1972-73. B.A., Florida State University, 1967; J.D., University of Florida,
1969; LL.M., New York University, 1971.
*0 B.S., Florida State University, 1967; M.B.A., University of Miami, 1971.
1. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330. For a cursory outline of the major provisions of the
Florida Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (hereinafter referred to as FRLTA), see Wil-
liams, Governor Signs Landlord-Tenant Act, 47 FLA. B.J. 462 (1973).
2. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. 1967); Lemle v.
Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Lund v. MacArthur, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii 1969);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971);
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268 (N.J. 1969); Pines v. Perssion, Ill N.W.2d
409 (Wis. 1961).
3. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. tit. 33, ch. 3 (1973); HAWAH REv. STAT. ch. 521 (Supp. 1972); see
Blumberg, Analysis of Recently Enacted Arizona and Washington State Landlord-Tenant
Bills, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 134 (1973); Blumberg, The Ohio Struggle with the Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 265 (1973). For a
complete list of state statutes, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note § 5
(Discussion Draft 1973). For an overall view of the entire area, both legislative and ju-
dicial, see Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibli-
ography, 26 VAND. L. REV. 689 (1973).
4. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as MODEL CODE]; Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Mod-
ern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 369 (1970);
Levi, New Landlord-Tenant Legal Relations-The Model Landlord-Tenant Code, 3 UR-
BAN LAWYER 592 (1971); Note, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code, 26 Rtrr-
GERs L. REV. 647 (1973); Comment, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code-Proposed
Procedural Reforms, 25 U. MIAMi L. REV. 317 (1971).
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or code, approach.5 In 1972 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws promulgated its Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (URLTA). It was the subject of several years work by
the Conference, and some of the persons responsible for the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation Model Code participated in its preparation.
In April 1972 the Florida Law Revision Counci 7 commenced its
landlord-tenant project. The Council began with one of the prelimi-
nary drafts of the URLTA and during the ensuing eleven months con-
sidered seven working drafts before completing in March 1973 its rec-
ommended Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act." The sub-
stantive portions of the FRLTA, most of which are codified as Part II
of chapter 83, Florida statutes, are patterned after the URLTA.9
The Law Revision Council concluded that there were essentially
three defects in Florida's landlord-tenant law.10 First, there was no codi-
fication of the substantive legal principles governing the landlord-ten-
ant relationship.1 Secondly, Florida law did not differentiate between
commercial leases and residential leases. Finally, the Council "found
it evident that Florida landlord-tenant law, both substantive and pro-
cedural, was weighted on the side of the landlord without correspond-
ing protection for the tenant.' 12
Many of the defects the Council perceived existed because the same
laws controlled both commercial and residential leases. The failure to
differentiate between commercial and residential leases is part of the
rationale of such recent Florida decisions as those upholding exculpa-
5. See MODEL CODE 1.
6. Subcommittee of the Committee on Leases of the Model Landlord-Tenant Act,
Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRUST J. 104 (1973) (copy of the Uniform Act. [hereinafter referred to as URLTA] is re-
printed as an appendix to this article); Note, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act: Reconciling Landlord-Tenant Law with Modern Realities, 6 IND. L. REV. 741
(1973).
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 13.90-.996 (1971). The Law Revision Council is composed of two sen-
ators appointed by the President of the Senate, two representatives appointed by the
Speaker of the House, and eight lawyers or law professors appointed by the Governor. The
landlord-tenant project was one of many carried out by the Council.
8. FLORIDA LAW REVISION COUNCIL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON FLORIDA LAND-
LORD-TENANT LAW (March 1973) [hereinafter referred to as COUNCIL REPORT]. This pub-
lication contains the FRLTA as it was proposed by the Council, not as it was signed into
law.
9. The main differences lie in the early sections of the URLTA, dealing with the
purpose of the Act, legislative intent and service of process, which are excluded from the
FRLTA, and the remedies portions, which are greatly simplified in the FRLTA. The
FRLTA also makes a substantial departure in wording.
10. COUNCIL REPORT 2.
11. The statutory law on the subject was essentially procedural. See FLA. STAT. ch.
83 (1971).
12. COUNCIL REPORT 3.
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tory clauses in residential leases'" and waivers of statutory notice before
eviction. 14 A clear understanding of the unequal bargaining position of
the parties-5 and a conviction that the law should develop different
rules to govern such unequal relationships might have led to different
results in these cases. 16 There is an unmistakable trend in the law to-
ward treating consumer transactions by rules different from those gov-
erning commercial transactions, 7 and it was this underlying concept
that militated in favor of a landlord-tenant act solely for residential
tenancies.
The Law Revision Council's completed recommendation was in-
troduced in the Senate as S. 255.1s A key decision was made to refer
the bill to a newly created standing committee, the Senate Consumer
Affairs Committee.' 9 From there, the bill was reported favorably to
the Senate as a committee substitute2 0 and was placed on the Senate
calendar.
Strong opposition lobbying by the Florida Association of Housing
and Redevelopment Officials subjected the bill to an attempt to re-
move it from the Senate calendar and refer it to the Senate Commerce
Committee2 1 where its future would have been uncertain. Sponsors
overcame this challenge, however, and kept the bill on the calendar.
In the House of Representatives, the Law Revision Council recom-
mendation was submitted to the Judiciary Committee as a proposed
13. See Middleton v. Lomaskin, 266 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Judge
Pearson's dissent recognized the unequal bargaining position between landlord and ten-
ant. See Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MIcH.
L. REv. 247, 270-74 (1970).
14. See Moskos v. Hand, 247 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
15. See generally Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study,
69 MIcH. L. REv. 247 (1970); Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of An Ad-
hesion Contract, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197 (1963).
16. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971) (hold-
ing an exculpatory clause in a lease to be void as against public policy).
17. Compare D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (upholding con-
fession of judgment clause against a corporation), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (striking down the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin laws). Compare
Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., Ill A.2d 425 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955) (invalidating exculpa-
tory clause in residential lease), with Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Assoc. Prop., 216
A.2d 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966) (upholding exculpatory clause in commercial lease). See
also W.C. James, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 347 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1972).
18. FLA. S. Jous. 48 (1973).
19. Id. Other committees that arguably could have had jurisdiction over the bill
were the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee. The mem-
bership of these two committees indicated that the landlord-tenant bill would not be
favorably received.
20. FLA. S. JouR. 232 (1973). A committee substitute is created when the committee
reports out an entirely new bill instead of the old one with numerous amendments.
21. Id. at 233. Conventional practice is that a bill receives an assignment to only one
substantive committee.
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committee bill. This meant that the bill would be subject to committee
scrutiny and amendments before being formally introduced in the
House. After considerable work, both in the Law Revision Subcom-
mittee and in the full Judiciary Committee,2 2 the bill was introduced
as H.R. 1423.23 This bill would become the vehicle by which the
FRLTA would be passed by both houses.
Several days after its formal introduction, H.R. 1423 was brought
up on the floor of the House for debate, 2 4 and, after floor action that
spanned parts of two days,2 5 the bill was passed as amended.2 6 At this
point, the sponsors made a decision to abandon S. 255, which was on the
Senate calendar and could have been taken up by the Senate. It was
decided that H.R. 1423 (now in substantially different form from S.
255) should be sent to the Senate after House passage, considered by
the Senate Consumer Affairs Committee (which had already passed
on S. 255) and then placed on the Senate calendar.
This strategy avoided giving the House, which had passed H.R.
1423 by a fairly close margin, a second opportunity to consider the
entire bill as it would have had if the Senate bill had passed the Senate
and been sent to the House. Under the procedure adopted (the key to
which was the abandonment of S. 255), the House would only have
the opportunity to revisit the landlord-tenant bill later in the session
to accept or reject any amendments that the Senate placed on the
House product, H.R. 1423. The strategy, although ultimately success-
ful, caused delays and resulted in H.R. 1423 being taken up on the
Senate floor the day before the end of the regular session 7 and the
Senate amendments being approved by the House on the last day of
the session .2
After passage of H.R. 1423 by the House, it was sent to the Senate
and referred to the Senate Consumer Affairs Committee.2 9 It was
reported favorably and placed on the Senate calendar3o Some
three weeks later, in the face of a possibility that the bill would die on
22. Approximately fourteen hours of hearings and working sessions by the four per-
son subcommittee and approximately two hours of full committee time were devoted to
the bill.
23. FLA. H.R. JouR. 298 (1973).
24. id. at 375.
25. Id. at 375-77, 381-83.
26. Id. at 383.
27. FLA. S. JOUR. 721 (1973).
28. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1093-98 (1973).
29. FLA. S. JouR. 323 (1973). Although one might assume this was an automatic deci-
sion because the Senate bill had been referred to Consumer Affairs, it was not. Theoreti-
cally, the House bill could have been referred to a different committee. See note 19 supra.
30. FLA. S. JouR. 372 (1973).
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the calendar as the session ended, H.R. 1423 was taken up by the Sen-
ate and passed easily- 1 because of compromise amendments that had
been worked out between sponsors and opponents.32 The House con-
curred in the Senate amendments,13 and the bill was sent to the Gover-
nor, who signed it on June 25, 1973.
II. SCOPE AND APPLICATION
The FRLTA is not intended to apply to other than residential ten-
ancies. It places previously existing landlord-tenant statutes in Part I,
chapter 83, Florida statutes."4 Section 83.001 is added, which reads:
"This part [Part I] applies to nonresidential tenancies, and all tenan-
cies not governed by Part II of this chapter." 35
The FRLTA apparently presumes that residential landlords
have bargaining strength superior to their prospective tenants.3 6 The
reason for not extending coverage to nonresidential tenants is osten-
sibly that they, unlike the residential tenant, are able to negotiate for
themselves less burdensome leases. This assumption is defensible only
when the nonresidential landlord and prospective tenant are not dras-
tically unequal in bargaining strength. Thus those tenants who are non-
residential and whose bargaining strength is less than their landlords'
need protection but do not get it. Of course, the FRLTA is designed
specially to apply to residences, but there is no reason why the non-
31. Id. at 727.
32. The two most important compromises were to delete the prohibition of retaliatory
conduct by the landlord (see discussion at pp. 577-79 infra) and to include a requirement
that the tenant pay accrued rent into court whenever he raises any defenses to an evic-
tion based upon nonpayment of rent. (See discussion at pp. 585-89 infra).
33. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1098 (1973). The wisdom of the sponsors' strategy not to allow
the House another vote on the full bill is illustrated by the wide margin by which the
House accepted the Senate amendments, compared with the narrow margin by which the
bill itself passed the House initially.
34. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2.
35. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 1. The statutes are numbered such that Part I con-
tains FLA. STAT. §§ 83.001-.251 (1971). Part II is contained in Fla. Laws 1973, ch.
73-330, § 2 (§§ 83.40-.63). The following statutes have been renumbered as §§ 83.68, 83.69,
83.70 and 83.71, respectively: § 83.255 (proration of mobile home tenants' fees); § 83.271
(restrictions on mobile home evictions); § 83.281 (regulation of mobile home park
owners); § 83.291 (restriction on disposition of mobile homes).
36. This presumption is characteristic of much of the contemporary literature and
case law on landlord-tenant relations. Its concern is the indigent tenant, the slum where
he resides and the nefarious slumlord. While all this attention is not undeserved, it
should occasionally be recalled that indigents comprise but a small portion of all tenants.
The plight of the more comfortably situated tenant remains mostly undiscovered, so it
is difficult to tell whether the FRLTA is his salvation too.
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residential provisions should not be revised to offer at least some of
the protections afforded in the residential part.3 7
The FRLTA creates Part II of chapter 83, entitled "Landlord and
Tenant: Residential." It applies to "rental of a dwelling unit and a
mobile home lot." 38 "Dwelling unit" is defined, in part, as "[a] struc-
ture or part of a structure that is rented for use as a home, residence,
or sleeping place by one person or by two or more persons who main-
tain a common household .... .30 This inclusive language permits
Part II to extend not only to multi-unit and to single-unit dwellings,"
but to hotels and motels and individual rooms in hotels and motels.
Of course, there must be a landlord-tenant and not merely an inn-
keeper-guest relationship. It is the relationship of the parties rather
than the nature of the structure involved that determines the applica-
bility of the FRLTA.
Residential landlord-tenant relationships are governed by the
FRLTA, but it does not apply when residence is "incidental" to the
provision of services. 41 For example, residency in a bona fide nursing
home is incidental to the provision of nursing or geriatric care.4 2 These
and similar arrangements are usually contractual between the parties
and subject to other forms of state regulation. The question raised by
this exclusion is the degree of service that must be provided to make
residency incidental. A rule of reason should be developed to exclude
only those arrangements in which provision of the service is the pri-
mary reason the person resides in the particular place.
The FRLTA also excludes "[o]ccupancy under a contract of sale
of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part ..... 3 While
37. For example, the landlord's and tenant's obligation to maintain the premises
(§§ 83.51, 83.52, respectively), remedies to enforce the obligation (§§ 83.55-.56), and pro-
hibition against exculpatory clauses (§ 83.47 (1)(b)), could be extended to nonresidential
tenancies, at least in modified form.
38. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.41).
39. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.43(2)).
40. Not all of Part II applies to single-unit dwellings. The landlord's obligation to
maintain the premises is not waivable or alterable, except that it may be "altered or
modified in writing with respect to a single family home or duplex." Fla. Laws 1973,
ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51(l)(c)). Also, the landlord's maintenance obligations under §
83.51(2) do not apply to single-family homes or duplexes.
41. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.42), provides:
This part does not apply to the following: (1) Residency or detention in a facility,
whether public or private, where residence or detention is incidental to the provi-
sions [sic] of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar services.
42. In its comment on this exclusion, the Law Revision Council stated: "It is not
intended to apply where residence is incidental to another primary purpose such as resi-
dence in a prison, hospital, nursing home, or a dormitory owned and operated by a col-
lege or school." COUNCIL REPORT 10-11.
43. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.42 (2)).
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this language is probably sufficiently broad to encompass occupancy
by a condominium owner, the legislature nevertheless expressly ex-
cluded such occupancy. 4 Neither exclusion will apply when a condo-
minium owner leases the unit. Occupancy by the holder of a proprie-
tary lease in a cooperative apartment is also excluded.
4 5
The most ambiguous exclusion is that of "[t]ransient occupancy in
a hotel, condominium, motel, rooming house, or similar public lodg-
ing."46 "Transient occupancy" is defined as "occupancy where it is the
intention of the parties that the occupancy will be temporary.'
T
Though this definition is circular, it, together with the transiency ex-
clusion, requires an affirmative showing of intent by the party seeking
to establish transiency and thus to avoid the FRLTA. A tenancy of
indefinite duration, in which the parties did not contemplate a termi-
nation date, would not be "transient."
The transient occupancy exclusion is concerned not with the com-
mercial significance of a structure but rather with the intention of the
occupant. The distinction is significant. Hotels, motels, rooming houses
and "similar public lodging" whose primary business is to provide
accommodations for transients will nevertheless be subject to the
FRLTA for those occupants who are not transient. The definition of
"dwelling unit" includes "part of a structure . . . rented . . . as a
...home, residence, or sleeping place. ' ' 48 Thus, the FRLTA will
apply only to rooms occupied by nontransients. Since the intent is to
protect rented residences, it is appropriate that protection extend with-
out regard to the type of structure within which the residence is lo-
cated.
III. THE LEASE
A. Contract or Conveyance?
The common law considered a lease an instrument of conveyance4 9
and not a contract. The landlord-tenant relationship, however, is gov-
44. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.42 (5)). The purchaser of a new condominium
unit receives protection in the form of an implied warranty of fitness and merchantabil-
ity running from the builder-seller, Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.),
petition for cert. discharged, 264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972), as well as the protection of the
condominium statutes, FLA. STAT. ch. 711 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
45. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.42 (4)); see 3 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRAC-
TICE § 37.25 (1966); Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual Interest in a Coopera-
tive Apartment: Realty or Personalty?, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 250 (1973).
46. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.42 (3)).
47. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.43 (10)).
48. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.43 (2) (a)).
49. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 317 (5th ed. 1773); 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 74 (3d ed. 1939).
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erned by many common law and statutory concepts that are superim-
posed on the provisions of the lease/contract between the parties. This
results in the courts not actually treating a lease as a contract, though
they are often willing to use the terms interchangeably.50 For example,
the Florida Supreme Court, in a case that did not concern a landlord-
tenant relationship, stated: 51 "The general right to contract is subject
to the limitation that the agreement must not violate the . . . state
statutes or ordinances of a city or town...." Under this doctrine, a
landlord who rents a dwelling unit with existing housing code viola-
tions would be entering an illegal contract/lease. The requirements
of the housing codes do not apply while the unit is vacant,52 so it is the
occupancy contemplated by the contract/lease that triggers the viola-
tions. Thus, there is a contract for an illegal purpose, which under
contract law would be invalid and unenforceable. 53 Failure of consid-
eration is a similar contract law argument that can be applied to land-
lord-tenant cases in which the premises are substandard. 54 Neither de-
fense, however, has been allowed by the Florida courts in landlord-
tenant cases.55
The FRLTA does not use either the term "lease" or "contract." It
uses the term "rental agreement," defined as follows: 56 "any agreement,
written, or oral if for less than the duration of one year, providing for
use and occupancy of premises." The provision limiting oral rental
agreements to less than one year was to avoid the possible interpreta-
50. E.g., Meiselman v. Seminole Drug Corp., 260 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 265 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1972) ("the lease never came into being as a bind-
ing contract between the parties"); National Hotel, Inc. v. Koretzky, 96 So. 2d 774, 776
(Fla. 1957) ("a lease agreement, like any other contract, must be construed to give effect
to the intention of the parties").
51. 'Wechsler v. Novak, 26 So. 2d 884, 887 (Fla. 1946) (contract to illegally influence
public officials). See also H.B. Holding Co. v. Girtman, 96 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1957).
52. See, e.g., MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 17-25 (1966).
53. See Shephard v. Lerner, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960); Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,
237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Della Corp. v. Diamond, 210 A.2d 847 (Del. 1965).
See generally 2 NATIONAL HOUSING & DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJEcT, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING
LAW 11-13 to 11-16 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as HANDBOOK ON HOUSING]. A corollary
argument is that the landlord performed illegally when there is no evidence of violations
at the inception of the lease. See Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1968), rev'd, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
54. 2 HANDBOOK ON HOUSING 11-20 to 11-32.
55. See, e.g., Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(court upheld lower court's order striking defense of illegal contract and failure of con-
sideration in a suit for possession based on nonpayment of rent).
56. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.43 (7)); see URLTA § 1.301 (11); MODEL CODE
§ 1-207. The parol evidence rule should still apply. See Parkleigh House, Inc. v. Wahl,
97 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
[Vol. 1:555
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
tion of repeal by implication of the Statute of Frauds provisions relat-
ing to leases. 57
It is anticipated that the FRLTA will resolve most of the problems
caused by the differentiation between leases and contracts, not because
of the new term "rental agreement," but because the substantive pro-
visions adequately express respective duties and remedies. These pro-
visions will make it unnecessary to continue the argument of whether
a lease is a contract or a conveyance.
One interesting question remaining is the effect to be given "rules
and regulations" of the landlord that are included by reference in the
lease. The URLTA contains specific provisions governing landlords'
rules and regulations," which the Law Revision Council decided to
exclude from its final recommendation. It was thought that rules and
regulations could be included under the broad definition of "rental
agreement" or that they could be included within the provisions of the
rental agreement. 59
B. Tenant's Avoidance of Unfair Rental Agreement Provisions
The FRLTA imposes an obligation of good faith on the perform-
ance or enforcement of the provisions in a rental agreement or of any
duty required by Part II of chapter 83, Florida statutes.60 "Good faith"
is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned, '' 61 the obligation of good faith and its definition being pat-
terned after the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).62
It is somewhat unclear how the obligation of good faith fits into the
procedural scheme of landlord-tenant law. A violation of the provision
could give rise to a cause of action for damages or for equitable relief,
though it is difficult to predict whether good faith could be raised by
a tenant as a defense to an action for possession. Presumably it could.
The one obvious advantage of the good faith requirement is that it
applies to acts of the parties whenever they occur and is not limited
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.01, 725.01 (1971).
58. URLTA § 3.102.
59. For a discussion of the general question of landlords' rules and regulations, see
Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems with Reference
to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGs L. REv. 369, 392-93 (1970).
60. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.44).
61. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.43 (8)).
62. The substantive provision appears in FLA. STAT. § 671.203(19) (1971), and the
definition is in FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1971). See also Murray, The Consumer and the
Code: A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 11, 13-16 (1968); Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203 (1962).
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to circumstances at the time the rental agreement is entered into as is
the unconscionability provision.
A much stronger mechanism than the good faith requirement for
avoiding the consequences of burdensome provisions in the rental
agreement is the FRLTA's section on unconscionability. 3 Once again,
the section is patterned closely after the UCC provision.64 Neither the
UCC nor the FRLTA has a definition of the term "unconscion-
able."6 5
The FRLTA provision, like the UCC, requires a finding of un-
conscionability "as a matter of law," which must exist at the time the
rental agreement was made. A detailed discussion of the doctrine of
unconscionability is beyond the scope of this article, but its inclusion
in the FRLTA is likely to have a significant impact on the decision of
future landlord-tenant cases. For example, even though the FRLTA
contains no specific limit on the amount of rent or security deposit a
landlord may require, could a court reduce the amount on the ground
that it was unconscionable and enforce the reduction through its
equitable powers?66 Decisions under the UCC section will probably
have an important influence on the interpretation of the FRLTA
section.67
There were two types of lease clauses that the Law Revision Coun-
cil decided were so unfair and against public policy that they should be
63. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.45), provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a rental agreement or any provision
of a rental agreement to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the rental agreement, or it may enforce the remainder
of the rental agreement without the unconscionable provision, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable provision as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the rental agreement or
any provision thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to meaning, the relationship of the
parties, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.302, Comment (1971).
65. This was the key criticism in Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emper-
or's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); see Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability
Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969).
66. Price alone, without other factors such as fraud or deception, is an emerging
concept as a ground for a finding of unconscionability. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298
N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Zuckman, Walker-Thomas Strikes Back: Comment on the
Pleading and Proof of Price Unconscionability, 30 FED. B.J. 308 (1971).
67. See 1 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1962); Dav-
enport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121
(1967). For a discussion of the doctrine of unconscionability as it relates to landlord-
tenant law, see Tawn Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP.
% 17,144 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.5, comment t
(Discussion Draft 1973).
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specifically prohibited. These were exculpatory clauses and waivers of
statutory procedures and protections.68 These clauses could have been
left for challenge under the unconscionability section, but this was con-
sidered not sufficiently certain. An exculpatory clause is a provision in
which the tenant agrees to waive a cause of action against the landlord,
usually for negligence, that would otherwise arise. These provisions
are sometimes held invalid as against public policy, 9 but a Florida
court recently upheld an exculpatory clause in a residential lease.
70
The FRLTA provision has the effect of overruling this case. In another
recent case, 71 a Florida court upheld a lease clause in which the tenant
waived his statutory right7 2 to receive notice of nonpayment of rent be-
fore eviction. The FRLTA renders void and unenforceable those lease
provisions that waive "rights, remedies and requirements" of the Act
including those that waive notice requirements. This reflects the view
that landlords often are in a superior bargaining position and are able
to impose onerous terms on the tenant. The terms are especially oner-
ous when they exculpate a landlord from his negligence or deprive a
tenant of notice or other procedural protections.7 3
Obligations under the FRLTA cannot be waived except when there
is express statutory authorization to do so. The URL'FA contains a
penalty provision, which applies even in the absence of actual dam-
ages, for the deliberate inclusion of prohibited provisions in rental
agreements. 74 The Florida Law Revision Council rejected this approach
because of its general philosophical opposition to civil penalties. Con-
sequently, the FRLTA authorizes only the recovery of actual dam-
ages resulting from the inclusion of prohibited provisions in rental
agreements. 5
If a rental agreement contains a commonly used provision allow-
ing the landlord to recover attorney's fees if he is required to take
action against a tenant, the FRLTA provides that the tenant may be
68. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.47); see URLTA § 1.403; MODEL CODE § 2-406.
69. Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
70. Middleton v. Lomaskin, 266 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); accord,
Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), rev'd, 495 S.W.2d
887 (Tex. 1973); 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 432 (1972). Contra, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321
(McKinney 1964); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971); 7
WILLAMETTE L.J. 516 (1971). See generally Alexander, Drafting Exculpatory Clauses in
a Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 676 (1967).
71. Moskos v. Hand, 247 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
72. FLA. STAT. § 83.20 (2) (1971). This provision is carried over in Fla. Laws 1973, ch.
73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56 (3)).
73. Nonwaiver provisions exist elsewhere in Florida law. E.g., FLA. STAT. § § 83.261 (3),
520.13, 520.40, 520.75 (1971).
74. URLTA § 1.403(b).
75. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.47 (2)).
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awarded his attorney's fees if he prevails in an action by or against
the landlord.7 6 This is based on a similar New York statute, 7 which
apparently recognizes that the landlord is generally in a position to
insert such a provision while the tenant is not. The URLTA prohibits
attorney's fee provisions.-8
A rule of landlord-tenant law that distinguishes it from contract law
is the doctrine of independent covenants.79 It provides that the cove-
nants to a lease are independent of each other and that a breach by one
party of his covenant or obligation does not excuse the other party
from continued performance of his obligations. Thus, even if the ten-
ant were able to extract from the landlord an express covenant to keep
the dwelling unit in repair, a breach by the landlord would not justify
abandonment or nonpayment of rent by the tenant.8 0 A Florida court
has, however, recently held that the lessor's breach of an express agree-
ment to repair a roof prior to the lessee's taking possession prevented
the lease from ever taking effect. The court found that performance
of the repairs was a condition precedent.8 '
Careful consideration of the doctrine of independent covenants
would lead to the conclusion that, if it operated with regard to both
parties, the tenant's nonpayment of rent would merely give the land-
lord a cause of action for the rent as it accrued s2 This inconvenience to
76. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.48). The FRLTA also contains a special
attorney's fee provision for security deposit litigation. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5
(§ 83.49 (3) (c)).
77. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1968).
78. URLTA § 1.403 (a) (3).
79. Meredith Mechanic Ass'n v. American Twist-Drill Co., 39 A. 330, 331 (N.H. 1893);
2 R. BoYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 35.10, at 1271 nn.6 & 7 (1972) [here-
inafter referred to as BOYER]. The United States Supreme Court upheld the effects of the
doctrine of independent covenants in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). See Clough,
The Case Against the Doctrine of Independent Covenants: Reform of Oregon's FED Pro-
cedure, 52 ORE. L. REV. 39 (1972); 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 747 (1972).
80. 2 BOYER § 35.10, at 1271 n.6. This is, however, somewhat inconsistent with the
remedy authorized by Florida courts of repair by the tenant and deduction of the costs
of such repair from the tenant's rent. Cf. Rosen v. Needelman, 83 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla.
1955); Masser v. London Operating Co., 145 So. 79, 84 (Fla. 1932). This remedy was not in-
cluded in the FRLTA for the reason that it could be subjected to extensive abuse by ten-
ants and that effective controls could not be drawn. Tenants who now have the benefit of
the protections of § 83.51, however, requiring the landlord to maintain the premises,
could well argue that they have the right to repair and deduct under the old rules re-
garding express covenants. This would be based on the cases holding that statutes relating
to landlord-tenant relationships are read into, and considered part of, all leases. Baker
v. Clifford-Mathew Inv. Co., 128 So. 827, 830 (Fla. 1930).
81. Meiselman v. Seminole Drug Corp., 260 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 265 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1972).
82. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 n.4 (1969) [herein-
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landlord interests was quickly overcome by the inclusion of specific
lease provisions authorizing termination of the lease for nonpayment
of rent"3 and by the passage of statutes authorizing the landlord to
regain possession through a summary procedure upon nonpayment.84
These statutes abrogated the common law doctrine of independent
covenants. Thus the adverse effects of the doctrine have not generally
been visited upon landlords.
The situation was somewhat different with regard to the landlord's
covenant of quiet enjoyment, which was implied, absent express agree-
ment to the contrary, in all leases. 5 A serious breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment was termed a "constructive eviction," which per-
mitted the tenant to cease paying rent and recover damages, provided
he abandoned the premises.8 7 The doctrine of independent covenants
did not vitiate the tenant's rights with regard to constructive eviction,
because the landlord's action was treated as if it were an actual eviction
in which the landlord renounced the lease. Without possession, there
was a total failure of consideration. 8
The FRLTA greatly expands the tenant's remedies beyond those
given him under the constructive eviction doctrine. Termination of
the rental agreement for the landlord's breach" and limited rent with-
after referred to as Quinn & Phillips]; see Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
83. For such a provision, see 2 BOYER § 35.08, at 1237. Acceleration clauses in leases
have been upheld in Florida, but the landlord must deduct the income he derives from
re-letting the premises. Jimmy Hall's Morningside, Inc. v. Blackburn & Peck Enterprises,
Inc., 235 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
84. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.05, 83.20(2) (1971).
85. "[T]he lessee shall have the quiet and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the
leased premises during the continuance of the lease." 2 BoYvm § 35.09[2], at 1258. See also
McClosky v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1951); Hankins v. Smith, 138 So. 494, 496
(Fla. 1931).
86. 2 BoYER § 35.09[2], at 1259 n.16; see Hankins v. Smith, 138 So. 494, 495 (Fla.
1931) ("A 'constructive eviction' is an act which, although not amounting to an actual
eviction, is done with the express or implied intention, and has the effect, of essentially
interfering with the tenant's beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises."); Commentary,
Landlord's Lament: New Tenant Remedies in Florida, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 769, 773 n.38
(1972). See also Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Inv. Corp., 143 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
87. See, e.g., Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
But see Carner v. Shapiro, 106 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
88. Quinn & Phillips 229 n.6.
89. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56 (1)), provides:
If the landlord materially fails to comply with § 83.51 (1) or material provisions
of the rental agreement within seven days after delivery of written notice by the
tenant specifying the noncompliance and indicating the intention of the tenant to
terminate the rental agreement by reason thereof, the tenant may terminate the
rental agreement. If the failure to comply with § 83.51 (1) or material provisions of
the rental agreement is due to causes beyond the control of the landlord and the
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holding0 give the tenant far broader remedies than the constructive
eviction doctrine. Thus, in circumstances far less serious than would
be required to establish a common law constructive eviction, the
FRLTA gives the tenant realistic remedies.
The doctrine of independent covenants, along with the statutes
allowing the landlord to recover possession for nonpayment of rent,
resulted in the rule that payment was the only defense to an action
for possession based on nonpayment of rent.91 This rule was upheld
recently by the United States Supreme Court in an Oregon case that
challenged it as a deprivation of due process of law.92 Equitable de-
fenses to eviction could be raised by a separate equity action,93 or by
counterclaim. The timing problems,94 however, along with the other
problems associated with multiple litigation in cases involving small
monetary amounts, discouraged the use of these remedies.
In the Law Revision Council's initial stages of discussion, some
consideration was given to a single statutory statement that all obliga-
tions in rental agreements were to be construed as dependent.9 5 This
was rejected in favor of the specific delineation of remedies, which has
the effect of abolishing the doctrine of independent covenants. For
example, the FRLTA provides that a material noncompliance by the
landlord with his maintenance obligations under section 83.51 (1) will
landlord has made and continues to make every reasonable effort to correct the
failure to comply, the rental agreement may be terminated, or altered by the par-
ties, as follows:
(a) if the landlord's failure to comply renders the dwelling unit untenantable
and the tenant vacates, the tenant shall not be liable for rent during the period
the dwelling unit remains uninhabitable;
(b) if the landlord's failure to comply does not render the dwelling unit un-
tenantable and the tenant remains in occupancy, the rent for the period of non-
compliance shall be reduced by an amount in proportion to the loss of rental value
caused by the noncompliance.
90. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.60(1)).
91. See Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch, 63 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. 1953); Brownlee v. Sussman,
238 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). But see Avvenire College for Women, Inc.
v. G.B.D., Inc., 240 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (decided two months after
Brownlee but not citing it). Equitable defenses were excluded, even under Avvenire, be-
cause of the lack of equitable jurisdiction of the court.
92. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). For a discussion of this case at it relates
to Florida law, see 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 220 (1972).
93. Rader v. Prather, 130 So. 15 (Fla. 1930); Knight v. Global Contact Lens, Inc., 220
So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
94. These suits travel under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the normal
court calendars, while evictions normally travel under the summary procedure statute,
FLA. STAT. ch. 51 (1971).
95. For an example of such a statutory statement, see MODL CODE § 2-102 (2).
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give the tenant a defense to an action for possession based on nonpay-
ment of rent.96
The tenant is also authorized to raise any defense, whether legal
or equitable, to an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent.9
Presumably, the tenant could always raise any defense he had to an
action for possession based upon termination of a tenancy at will or at
sufferance, breach of lease, or existence of a holdover situation.9s
Finally, the tenant is given the right to terminate the rental agree-
ment for a material noncompliance by the landlord with his main-
tenance obligations under section 83.51(1) or with material provi-
sions of the rental agreement. 9 The effect of authorizing these ten-
ant actions is to treat the landlord's obligations as dependent, allowing
the tenant the option to discontinue performance or to sue for redress.
C. Common Law Tenancies
The FRLTA does not use the terms "tenancy at will," "periodic
tenancy" or "tenancy at sufferance," 100 but in effect continues the rules
of law applicable to all three. 10 1 Under the FRLTA, contrary to prior
Florida law, a tenancy for a specific term of less than one year can be
created by oral agreement. 102
The most important result of retaining these rules of law, even
though the terminology is changed, is that the termination of tenan-
cies without specific duration and the refusal to renew expired tenan-
cies can be accomplished by the landlord without any requirement of
giving justification or reason. This has been one of the critical defi-
ciencies in the URLTA from the tenant's point of view.10 3 The allow-
96. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.60(t)). Noncompliance with § 83.51 (2), as
opposed to § 83.51 (1), is specifically disallowed as a defense to an action for possession
based on nonpayment of rent. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51(2)(b)). But see Fla.
Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (4)).
97. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.60(1)). This should put to rest the appar-
ent conflict between Brownlee and Avvenire.
98. The available defenses to such actions were quite limited, and still are under the
FRLTA.
99. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56 (1)).
100. 4 J. ADKINS, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 105.03-.04 (1960).
101. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§§ 83.46, 83.57, 83.58). It should be noted that a
tenant at sufferance or holdover tenant is not entitled to notice as a condition precedent
to the landlord's right to file an action for possession, as is a tenant at will or a tenant
whose rental agreement is being terminated for cause.
102. Compare Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§§ 83.43(7), 83.46(2)), with FLA. STAT.
§ 83.01 (1971).
103. Thomas, A Uniform Landlord Tenant Relations Act in 1972, TENANTS OUTLOOK,
May 1972, at 2 ("NTO contends that landlords should only be allowed to terminate
tenancies for just cause").
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ance of eviction without the requirement of good cause makes retalia-
tory eviction possible. 10 4 Eviction without good cause is probably the
most critical remaining issue in the development of landlord-tenant law
in this country.
The FRLTA contains a provision allowing the landlord to recover
double rent for the period a tenant holds over without permission.1 5
It has been held, under a similar double rent statute, 0 r that the penalty
was only applicable upon expiration and not upon termination of the
lease,'10 7 and that such damages were not available when continued
possession was based upon "a bona fide claim of right based on reason-
able grounds.' 01 8 In order to be recovered, double rent must be de-
manded in the landlord's complaint.10 9
In a case where the landlord did not sustain damages in an amount
equal to double the rent, this section could be construed to impose a
penalty, in addition to actual damages, that would not be enforced by
a court. This would be analogous to the situation in which the land-
lord claims the total amount of a security deposit as liquidated dam-
ages. The courts allow only the amount of actual damages and hold any
excess to be a penalty and not recoverable." 0
D. Landlord's Obligation to Maintain Premises
The FRLTA establishes the landlord's obligation to maintain the
residential premises."' Florida statutes have never dealt with this is-
104. See discussion at pp. 577-79 infra. Interestingly, the 1972 Florida Legislature im-
posed a requirement of an acceptable reason for evictions from mobile home parks,
thus changing hundreds of years of common law. FLA. STAT. § 83.271 (1) (Supp. 1972),
as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-182, § 1.
105. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.58). See also MODEL CODE § 2-310(3). It has
been held that a tenant who holds over as to part of the premises holds over as to all
of it. David Properties, Inc. v. Selk, 151 So. 2d 334, 338 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
106. FLA. STAT. § 83.06 (1) (1971).
107. Wagner v. Rice, 97 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1957).
108. Central Fla. Oil Co. v. Blue Flame, Inc., 87 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1956), relying
on Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So. 2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1955).
109. Id.; accord, David Properties, Inc. v. Selk, 151 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). See generally Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Mod-
ern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HAsTINcs L.J. 369, 397-98
(1970); MODEL CODE § 2-310, Commentary.
110. Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, 58 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1951); Anderson, Negotiating and
Drafting Leases for the Landlord, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 360, 369-371 (1971).
111. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51), provides:
(1) The landlord at all times during the tenancy shall:
(a) Comply with the requirements of applicable building, housing and health
codes; or
(b) where there are no applicable building, housing or health codes, maintain
the roofs, windows, screens, doors, floors, steps, porches, exterior walls, foundations,
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sue, but the common law rule has been that in the absence of an ex-
press covenant to repair, the landlord has no duty to repair defects
that were present at the time of letting the premises or that developed
later.11 2 Thus, the rule of caveat emptor applied to landlord-tenant
transactions. The landlord's duty to repair, often called an "implied
warranty of habitability," has been imposed in a number of jurisdic-
tions by judicial decision. 1 13 Also, various exceptions to the caveat
emptor doctrine have been carved out by the courts in special circum-
stances.""
In Florida, an attempt judicially to establish an implied warranty
of habitability recently failed' 1 5 A tenant sought to defend an eviction
for nonpayment of rent by raising as an affirmative defense approxi-
mately twenty-five violations of the Dade County Minimum Housing
Code that had been in existence since the tenant's occupancy. The trial
court granted a motion to strike the affirmative defenses. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, the lower court was affirmed
without opinion.1 6 Although somewhat clouded by procedural as-
pects, 1 7 the case was an indication that the Florida Supreme Court
was not willing to impose judicially an implied warranty of habita-
bility.
The common law rule that the landlord had no duty to repair was
based upon the concept that a lease was a conveyance of real property
for a term." While Florida courts commonly refer to a lease as a con-
tract, they still apply the old common law principles that derived from
the view of a lease as a conveyance. 1 9 Because the land and not the
and all other structural components in good repair and capable of resisting normal
forces and loads, and maintain the plumbing in reasonable working condition; pro-
vided however, the landlord shall not be required to maintain a mobile home or
other structure owned by the tenant.
(c) The landlord's obligations under this subsection may be altered or modified
in writing with respect to a single family home or duplex.
See MODEL CODE § 2-203; URLTA § 2.104.
112. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Atlantic Manor, Inc., 181 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 3d Dist.
'Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1966); Easton v. Weir, 125 So. 2d 115
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 129 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1960).
113. See cases cited in note 2 supra. See generally Levine, The Warranty of Habita-
bility, 2 CONN. L. REv. 61 (1969).
114. E.g., Young v. Povich, 116 A. 26 (Me. 1922) (landlord obligated to make re-
pairs on furnished premises leased for short term); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass.
1892); 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
115. Barkley v. Keaton, No. 71-10598 (Dade County Civ. Ct. Rec., Oct. 28, 1971).
116. Keaton v. Barkley, 260 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972).
117. There was the problem of whether a breach of an implied warranty of habita-
bility, even if the court were to hold that it existed, could be raised as an affirmative
defense in an eviction for nonpayment of rent. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
118. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 74 (3d ed. 1939).
119. See note 49 supra.
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dwelling was the primary object of the lease, and because bargaining
strength lay with the mobile tenant, not imposing a duty to repair on
the landlord was understandable in its historical context. It has, how-
ever, become inappropriate for contemporary times when the dwelling
may be of primary importance. 120
As a standard for the landlord's performance of his maintenance ob-
ligations, the FRLTA requires compliance with applicable building,
housing and health codes.1 21 The codes are defined as "any law, ordi-
nance, or governmental regulation concerning health, safety, sanitation,
fitness for habitation, or the construction, maintenance, operation, oc-
cupancy, use or appearance of any dwelling unit . . "122 The most
important of these are local housing codes 1 2 3 which establish mainte-
nance standards for housing. Also included are local building and
health or sanitation codes, state statutes,'1 24 and state administrative
regulations.125
The existence of local housing codes126 has generally been of little
help to a tenant faced with a poorly maintained dwelling unit. These
codes are penal, giving to the government the right to prosecute the
landlord for failure to comply. They do not give the tenant remedies.12 7
The FRLTA also provides that when there are no applicable codes,
structural components and plumbing must be maintained in good
repair. -12
In an important compromise, section 83.51 (1) (c) was added on the
floor of the House. It provides: "The landlord's obligations under this
subsection [83.51 (1)] may be altered or modified in writing with re-
spect to a single family home or duplex."" 0 This provision is impor-
120. See Quinn & Phillips, supra note 82.
121. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (1) (a)).
122. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, §2 (§ 83.43 (1)).
123. See, e.g., TAMPA, FLA., CODE §§ 48-8 to -16 (1971); WEST PALM BE.ACH, FLA. CODE
ch. 27 (1962). Of course, the provisions of the code are subject to judicial scrutiny. See
Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); 23 U. FLA. L.
REV. 195 (1970).
124. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 509.211, 509.221 (1971).
125. E.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE chs. 7c-1 (particularly § 7c-1.03), 7c-2, lOd-9.
126. It appears there is no currently available analysis of the provisions of local codes
in Florida, or an evaluation of their enforcement.
127. See Sax & Hiestand, Slurnlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 871 (1967).
See also 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 769, 770 (1972).
128. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (1) (b)). The limitation of this paragraph
to areas "where there are no applicable building, housing or health codes," was not in
the original proposal, and was added in an amendment on the Senate floor. FLA. S. JoUR.
726 (1973). This provision was originally intended to serve as a minimum standard re-
gardless of where the premises were located.
129. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (1) (c)). Sponsors agreed to this in the
face of an amendment that would have allowed a written waiver of the landlord's main-
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tant because it allows the tenant to waive the landlord's obligation to
maintain the dwelling unit. These waivers should be strictly construed
against the landlord"' and, in appropriate circumstances, a tenant who
has been required to sign a waiver could argue that it is unenforceable
because it is unconscionable 131 or because it is not supported by con-
sideration (e.g., a reduced rent).132 This provision is not intended in
any way to affect the primary obligation of the landlord under the
housing codes."3
The second portion of the landlord's maintenance obligations is
contained in section 83.51 (2), which contains a list of duties in addi-
tion to those in section 83.51 (1).13 This provision can also be waived
in writing and does not apply to single-family homes or duplexes. In
the event that both subsection 83.51 (1) and subsection 83.51 (2) impose
a duty upon the landlord, subsection 83.51 (1) governs.1 3  Of course,
the landlord is not responsible for maintenance problems caused by the
tenant." 6
E. Tenant's Obligation to Maintain Dwelling Unit
It is a familiar common law doctrine that the tenant has a duty to
tenance obligations with regard to any dwelling unit. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 376 (1973). The
compromise amendment was worded differently from § 83.51(1)(c) of the final bill, but
it had the same effect. Id. at 382. The final language was adopted by the Senate Con-
sumer Affairs Committee. FLA. S. JOUR. 722 (1973).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.5, comment e, at 214 (Discussion Draft
1973).
131. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.45). For a discussion of unconscionabili-
ty and its application to leases in the absence of statute, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 5.5, comment f, at 215-16 (Discussion Draft 1973).
132. Separate consideration is required under MODEL CODE § 2-203 (2) (b)..
133. Cf. Lester v. City of St. Petersburg, 183 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 190 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1966); Heinlein v. Dade County, 33 Fla. Supp. 41,
46 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1969), af'd, 239 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
134. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (2)), provides:
(a) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, in addition to the requirements of sub-
section (1) of this section, the landlord of a dwelling unit other than a single fam-
ily home or duplex at all times during the tenancy shall make reasonable provi-
sions for:
(1) The extermination of rats, mice, roaches, ants, and bedbugs
(2) Locks and keys;
(3) The clean and safe condition of common areas;
(4) Garbage removal and outside receptacles therefor; and
(5) Heat during winter, running water, and hot water.
(b) Nothing in this part authorizes the tenant to raise a noncompliance by the
landlord with this subsection as a defense to an action for possession under §83.59.
(c) This subsection shall not apply to a mobile home owned by a tenant.
135. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (4)).
136. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (5)).
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protect the premises from waste.13 7 Waste has been defined as "any act
or omission of duty by a tenant of land which does a lasting injury
to the freehold, tends to the permanent loss of the owner of the fee,
or to destroy or lessen the value of an inheritance, or to destroy the
identity of the property, or impair the evidence of title."138 The doc-
trine imposes a relatively insubstantial duty on a tenant. Its main
thrust is to prevent actual destruction of the premises' structural com-
ponents. Consequently, the tenant's duty is customarily increased
through the use of lease provisions. For example, the Model Apartment
Lease imposes extensive duties of care on the tenant. 139 But in the ab-
sence of an express agreement, the doctrine of waste is the landlord's
only protection.
The FRLTA provides for the "[t]enant's obligation to maintain
[the] dwelling unit. ' ' 140 The enumerated obligations conform to the
137. See, e.g., 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 109 (1910). For
a thorough discussion of the doctrine of waste, including its historical origin, see Com-
ment, Periodic Tenant's Repair Obligation in Absence of Covenant, 41 MARQ. L. REV.
58 (1967). See also Annots., 22 A.L.R.3d 521 (1968); 80 A.L.R.2d 983 (1961); 20 A.L.R.2d
1331 (1951); 10 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1950); 45 A.L.R. 12 (1926).
138. 3A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1270 (repl. 1959). See also 2 BoYR §
35.03[5], at 1216. Stephenson v. National Bank, 109 So. 424 (Fla. 1926), remains the Florida
authority on waste. There the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from making al-
terations in the leased building by constructing partitions on the interior and making
some large openings in the exterior walls. Applying the common law rule, the court said
"any alterations of the buildings on leased premises by a tenant" constitute waste. Id. at
426. This was true even if the alteration was beneficial to the premises.
139. See, e.g., Standard Form of Apartment Lease Approved by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Model Apartment Lease, found in C. BERGER, LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE 294 (1968). This provides a set of tenant obligations such as com-
pliance with local codes and landlord rules, and repairing damage caused by the tenant.
Terms of the lease imposing a duty upon a tenant will of course vary according to the
tenant's bargaining power and the imagination of the landlord's counsel. A landlord may
also incorporate by reference in the lease a set of rules designed to supersede the doc-
trine of waste. See Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern
Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 392 (1970);
cf. MODEL CODE §§ 2-303, 2-311.
140. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.52), provides:
Tenant's obligation to maintain dwelling unit.
The tenant at all times during the tenancy shall:
(1) comply with all obligations imposed upon tenants by applicable provisions
of building, housing and health codes;
(2) keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses clean and
sanitary;
(3) remove from his dwelling unit all garbage in a clean and sanitary manner;
(4) keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant clean
and sanitary, and in repair;
(5) use and operate in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary,
heating, ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including
elevators;
(6) not destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the premises or
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language of many modern leases and give the landlord more protection
than the common law doctrine of waste. Thus the FRLTA specifies a
tenant's minimum obligation, which can be increased by the rental
agreement. The tenant's maintenance obligations may not be waived.14'
Tenants are required to "comply with all obligations imposed upon
tenants by applicable provisions of building, housing and health codes
*. 142 The impact of this provision is diminished by the absence of
building and housing codes in many municipalities and counties of the
state. A statewide health code could be promulgated to avoid the prob-
lems arising from the failure of some local governments to establish
health standards.143 Municipalities could, however, enact local health
regulations not inconsistent with the state scheme.1 44
At first glance it may appear that requiring the tenant to comply
with building, housing and health codes is a Draconian measure. But
landlords and tenants have always been subject to these codes, though
strict enforcement has been seldom observed. 4 5 There has not always
been, however, a statutory cause of action by one party against the
other for noncompliance with the codes. Enforcement formerly was
left to a "building official ' ' 14 6 or "rehabilitation officer."' 4 7 The FRLTA
incorporates these codes into the lease and makes their breach action-
able by the parties to the lease.
Another of the tenant's obligations is to "keep all plumbing fixtures
in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant clean and sanitary, and in
property therein belonging to the landlord, nor permit any person to do so; and
(7) conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his consent
to conduct themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably disturb his neigh-
bors or constitute a breach of the peace.
See also MODEL CODE §§ 2-303, 2-304; URLTA §§ 3.101, 4.202.
141. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.47 (1)(a)) (any provision that purports to
waive or preclude the rights, remedies or requirements set forth is void).
142. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.52(1)).
143. See FLA. STAT. § 381.031 (1971) (authorizing the Division of Health of the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to promulgate and enforce health regu-
lations).
144. FLA. STAT. § 381.101 (1971).
145. On the general subject of housing codes and their enforcement, see Bross, Law
Reform Alan Meets the Slumlord: Interactions of New Remedies and Old Buildings in
Housing Code Enforcement., 3 URBAN LAWYER 609 (1971); Castrataro, Housing Code En-
forcenient: A Century of Failure in New York City, 14 N.Y.L.F. 60 (1968); Grad, New
Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAWYER 577 (1971);
Gribetz, Housing Code Enforcement in 1970-An Overview, 3 URBAN LAWYER 525 (1971);
Gribetz &- Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965);
Comment, The Enforcement of the New Orleans Housing Code-An Analysis of Present
Problems and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 TUL. L. REv. 604 (1968).
146. WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE § 27-16 (1962).
147. TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 48-14 (1971).
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repair."'148 The italicized words present a conflict of the tenant's obli-
gations with those of the landlord. The landlord is required to "[c]om-
ply with the requirements of applicable building, housing and health
codes."' 14 9 For example, the city of West Palm Beach requires in its
housing code that an owner lease no dwelling unless certain minimum
standards are met. 50 One of the enumerated standards is that "[e]very
supplied plumbing fixture and water and waste pipe shall be prop-
erly installed and maintained in sanitary working condition." 5 If an
area has no applicable code, the FRLTA supplies the semblance of a
minimum housing code for the protection of tenants, at least for struc-
tural components. It requires the landlord to "maintain the plumbing
in reasonable working condition. 15
2
The dilemma is manifest. When the plumbing malfunctions, whose
duty is it to make repairs? One possible construction of the statute is
that the words "keep all plumbing fixtures . . . in repair" simply re-
quire the tenant to give reasonable notice to the landlord of the mal-
function, enabling the landlord at his cost to make the actual repair.
This interpretation is consistent with the overall scheme of the statute's
imposing on the landlord a duty to maintain structural components
in good repair. Tenants' duties, on the other hand, require only the
reasonable maintenance and operation of facilities. Thus it is unlikely
that the legislature intended to impose on the tenant the cost of plumb-
ing repairs. Absent this construction, the three words "and in repair"
must be dismissed as a carelessly enacted amendment to H.R. 1423.
The bill as drafted by the Law Revision Council and introduced in
the House of Representatives did not bear this language. 5 It came as
an amendment offered on the Senate floor, adopted by the Senate'14
and concurred in by the House. 55 It now remains for the legislature to
strike these unneeded words.
Under the FRLTA, the tenant has an obligation to "conduct him-
self and require other persons on the premises with his consent to con-
duct themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably disturb his
neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace."' 1 6 Tenants are accorded
by the common law an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment that pro-
148. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.52(4)) (emphasis added).
149. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (1) (a)).
150. WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE § 27-4 (1962).
151. WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE § 27-13 (7) (1962).
152. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.51 (1) (b)).
153. COUNCIL REPORT 18.
154. FLA. S. JouR. 726 (1973).
155. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1098 (1973).
156. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.52 (7)).
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hibits a landlord from unreasonably disturbing them. 15 7 Although there
are exceptions, this covenant is not usually extended to hold the land-
lord in breach for acts of other tenants or strangers on the premises.'"5
8
A tenant's remedy against noisy fellow tenants is usually limited to the
difficult suit for nuisance or to criminal complaint. Landlords typically
regulate tenant conduct by the use of rules incorporated by reference
into the lease or by provisions in the lease itself.
The FRLTA establishes a statutory duty for each tenant with re-
spect to every other tenant to refrain from unreasonable disturbances.
Presumably a breach of this duty would give rise to a cause of action
by the disturbed tenant. What constitutes an unreasonable disturbance
will be one of those difficult questions of fact with which the law is
so accustomed to dealing. Overly sensitive tenants will hopefully be
deterred from frivolous complaint by the cost and bother of litigation
and by the chance that their offender's conduct has not been an "un-
reasonable" disturbance. Tenants under the FRLTA owe a duty of
reasonable conduct to landlords also. Consequently, section 83.52 (7)
will complement apartment rules and supply a statutory minimum
code of conduct.
F. Retaliatory Conduct by the Landlord
The term "retaliatory eviction" was unknown at common law and
is only of recent origin in its application to landlord-tenant law. It
is the practice by a landlord of evicting-or threatening to evict-a
tenant who has reported housing or sanitary code violations to the
public authorities or who has engaged in activities thought by the
landlord to be inimical to him. The term is new in landlord-tenant
law only because in the past such evictions were not challenged.', 9
The Florida Law Revision Council's recommendation contained a
strong provision prohibiting retaliatory conduct by the landlord. 6 0 The
provision gave an evidentiary assist to the tenant by providing that a
landlord's attempted eviction, decrease in services or increase in rent,
within six months of a tenant's complaint of a code violation or certain
157. The covenant of quiet enjoyment was originally an express covenant of a lease.
Courts soon began to hold that in the absence of an express covenant, every lease has
an implied covenant of reasonable and quiet enjoyment. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Martin,
56 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951); Hankins v. Smith, 138 So. 494 (Fla. 1931).
158. For a thorough discussion of the common law liability of landlords and tenants
for disturbance, see Lloyd, The Disturbed Tenant-A Phase of Constructive Eviction, 79
U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1931).
159. 1 CCH POVERTY LAw REP. % 2325, at 3331 (1972).
160. COUNCIL REPORT 27-28. The Law Revision Council's proposal was quite similar
to the provisions in URLTA § 5.101 and MODEL CODE § 2-407.
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other specified activities, raised a rebuttable presumption of the land-
lord's retaliatory intent.16 1 Without the rebuttable presumption, the
tenant would be in the almost impossible position of having to prove
the landlord's retaliatory intent. The effect of the presumption was
merely to require the landlord to come forward with evidence of some
bona fide reason for his action. Without the rebuttable presumption
clause, the prohibition of retaliatory conduct by the landlord was prac-
tically unenforceable.
The House Judiciary Committee, in its deliberations prior to the
formal introduction of H.R. 1423, removed the rebuttable presump-
tion clause. 16 2 Consequently, the retaliatory conduct section was not
debated on the House floor when H.R. 1423 was passed. In the Senate,
however, in one of the compromises made by sponsors in the final days
of the session, the entire retaliatory conduct section was removed from
the bill on the floor of the Senate. 16 3 Thus the FRLTA as enacted has
no provision governing retaliatory conduct by the landlord.
The leading case in the country on retaliatory eviction is Edwards
v. Habib.164 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that retaliatory evictions are contrary to the
intent of the District of Columbia Housing and Sanitary Codes. Al-
though the court discussed the constitutional issues extensively, it did
not find it necessary to render a ruling on constitutional grounds. 16 5
161. COUNCIL REPORT 27-28. Massachusetts has had a similar provision since 1969.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1973). In Appelstein v. Quinn, 281 N.E.2d
228 (Mass. 1972), the court held that the presumption was rebuttable and has effect only
until evidence to the contrary appears. Accord, Silberg v. Lipscomb, 285 A.2d 86 (N.J.
Dist. Ct. 1971). See also Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
162. See Fla. H.R. 1423 § 2 (§ 83.64 (2)) (1973).
163. FLA. S. jouR. 726 (1973).
164. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). For a list of
comments on Edwards v. Habib, see Note, Landlord and Tenant-Burden of Proof Re-
quired to Establish Defense of Retaliatory Eviction, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 939, 943 n.29.
165. 397 F.2d at 699. The constitutional issues involved in retaliatory eviction are
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances and the right to speak
and associate freely. The latter comes into play when the landlord seeks to retaliate
against a tenant for participation in a tenant organization. The original Law Revision
Council proposal covered this situation. COUNCIL REPORT 27-28. A discussion of tenant
organizations and their role in advancing landlord-tenant law is beyond the scope of
this article. For a complete discussion, see I CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 1 2250 (1972); 2
HANDBOOK ON HOUSINC ch. 1; Moskovitz & Honigsberg, The Tenant Union-Landlord
Relations Act: A Proposal, 58 GEo. L.J. 1013 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law
and Operation in the State and Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 79 (1970); Note, Tenant
Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-Incone Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York declared re-
taliatory eviction unconstitutional. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217 (Hawaii 1973). The concept has
recently been expanded by the District of Columbia Circuit to prohibit termination of
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InI Florida, it is unclear whether retaliatory eviction will be toler-
ated. Legislation prohibiting such evictions has been introduced in
prior years but none has ever been considered on the floor of either
house."0 The only Florida appellate case to address the issue, Wilkins
v. Tebbetts,C 7 sheds little light on retaliatory eviction in Florida. It
affirmed a lower court judgment on the pleadings for the landlord on
the ground that the tenant, who had raised retaliatory eviction as a
defense, had not pleaded or attached to the answer the provision of
the fire code he claimed the landlord had violated. In 1971 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a per-
manent injunction against a landlord who threatened to evict mobile
home tenants for reporting sanitary and zoning violations.168 While
there have been some positive indications that proof of the landlord's
retaliatory intent would be a good defense to an eviction action, the
issue is far from settled. 6",
G. Security Deposits
The FRLTA significantly amends the existing statutory provisions
relating to security deposits.170 Probably the most significant change is
that advanced rent, in addition to security deposits, is now covered by
the law.17 1 This change imposes the same fiduciary responsibilities on
a landlord for advanced rent as had been previously required for se-
curity deposits. Another significant change is that now if one of the par-
ties institutes litigation relating to the security deposit and prevails,
he is entitled to receive his attorney's fees. 17 2
a tenancy at will when the tenant has made successful exercise of his rent-withholding
rights. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 463 (1973). See also Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Blanks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
166. Fla. S. 973, Fla. H.R. 4310 (1970) (both died in committee); Fla. S. 598 (1971)
(killed in committee); Fla. H.R. 580 (1971) (died in committee); Fla. S. 1388 (1971) (killed
in committee); Fla. S. 1046, Fla. H.R. 3933 (1972) (both died in committee).
167. 216 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). For an analogous case dealing with
retaliation against employees for filing unfair labor practice disputes, see Nash v. Florida
Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (holding that retaliation frustrates the legislative
purpose).
168. Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., I CCH POVERTY LAW REP. ff 2325.51 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
169. For a detailed discussion of the case and statutory law relating to retaliatory
conduct, see 1 CCH POVERTY LAW RE'. 2325 (1972); 2 HANDBOOK ON HOUSING ch. 3
(1970); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 753 (1971).
170. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (amends former FLA. STAT. § 83.261 (1971) and
renumbers it as § 83.49).
171. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (§ 83.49(4)) (removed advance rent exemption
from FLA. STAT. § 83.261 (5) (1971)).
172. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330. § 5 (§ 83.49 (3) (c)). In addition to FLA. STAT. §
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Most of the changes in wording in the security deposit sections are
meant to clarify existing provisions and to integrate them into the
FRLTA. For example, one problem had been that even though inter-
est was required on security deposits held under certain conditions by
landlords, tenants were not able to obtain enough information to de-
termine what amount of interest was due. The new provision requires
the landlord to give this information to the tenant in writing within
thirty days of the time he receives any advance rent or security de-
posit.1 73 Also, a payment or credit of interest to the tenant is required
at least once annually.1 7 4
The FRLTA sets out a statutory form of notice that the landlord
is required to mail to the tenant when he intends to impose a claim
upon the security deposit. 75 The superfluous requirement that the ten-
ant request the return of his security deposit in writing has been re-
moved. 1 76 Now the tenant need notify the landlord only if he wishes to
object to the landlord's claim. 7 1
The case law relating to security deposits as liquidated damages 78
and the distinction between security deposits and advanced rent7 9 will
still be applicable.
IV. REMEDIES
A. Termination of the Rental Agreement
The common law permitted landlords to terminate the rental agree-
83.261 (2) (1971), requiring the payment of interest while the landlord is holding the
security deposit, interest is due from the time the landlord wrongfully fails to return it.
Young v. Cobbs, 110 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1959).
173. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (§ 83.49 (2)).
174. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (§ 83.49(2)).
175. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (§ 83.49 (3) (a)).
176. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 5 (§ 83.49(3) (a)).
177. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-339, § 5 (§ 83.49 (3) (b)).
178. See, e.g., Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, 58 So. 2d 673 (Ha. 1951) (question of law);
Pappas v. Deringer, 145 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); 1 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
PRAcrseE § 16.58 (2d ed. 1971).
179. See, e.g., Casino Amusement Co. v. Ocean Beach Amusement Co., 133 So. 559
(Fla. 1931). The distinction that only as much of the security deposit as needed for actual
damages or back rent could be retained, whereas all of the advance rent could be re-
tained, Housholder v. Black, 62 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1952), has been changed by another
provision of the FRLTA. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.46 (1)) (rent uniformly
apportionable from day to day). Where a lease has been prematurely terminated, the
tenant may have to wait until the actual expiration of the lease before he can sue for
the return of the security deposit. Wagman v, Lefcoe, 167 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
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ment by several means: expiration of the agreed term,18 ° forfeiture,' 1
surrender, 82 and abandonment. 183 Legal literature and judicial opin-
ions abound on the vagaries of these doctrines so no effort is made here
to explicate them. Some of them have, however, been altered by or
incorporated into the FRLTA.
The FRLTA does not substantially alter the notion that a tenancy
expires at the expiration of the agreed term. It does provide, how-
ever, that in the absence of agreement otherwise, "the duration
is determined by the periods for which the rent is payable.' ' 1 84 When
the parties intend to execute a rental agreement for a specific term,
their intentions should be made clear. Otherwise the duration of the
rental agreement will be determined by the payment period. Notice
requirements may vary substantially -with the duration.' 85
Before a landlord can maintain a suit for possession, he must termi-
nate the rental agreement.1 6 Termination is permitted when the ten-
ant has materially failed to comply with his obligation to maintain
the dwelling unit or has failed to comply with material provisions of
the rental agreement. 187 Termination may also be had for the nonpay-
ment of rent.18 The landlord must give seven days notice of his inten-
tion to terminate for material noncompliance and he must specify in
the notice the noncompliance that provokes the termination. The no-
tice period for nonpayment of rent is three days and the notice must
be accompanied by a demand for rent. Upon termination, the landlord
is required either to return the tenant's security deposit or to notify
the tenant of his intention to impose a claim on it.189
The tenant can himself accomplish termination, allowing the land-
lord to recover possession without the need for litigation. This is done
by surrender or abandonment. 90 The difficulty of establishing that
abandonment has occurred can lead to a civil action against the land-
180. See, e.g., Baker v. Clifford-Mathew Inc. Co., 128 So. 827 (Fla. 1930); 1 AMERt-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.88 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
181. See, e.g., Augusta Corp. v. Strawn, 174 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1965); 2 BOYER § 36.10 (3), at 1303-06. See also FLA. STAT. § 796.02 (1971).
182. See, e.g., Babsdon Co. v. Thrifty Parking Co., 149 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Boyer & Ross, Real Property Law, 18 U. MIAMi L. REV. 799, 850 (1964); 2
BOYER § 36.10, at 1301-06.
183. See, e.g., Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953).
184. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.46 (2)).
185. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.57).
186. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.59 (1)).
187. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56(2)).
188. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56 (3)).
189. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56 (6)).
190. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§§ 83.59 (3) (b) (surrender), 83.59 (3) (c) (aban-
donment)).
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lord for trespass and wrongful eviction or to criminal complaint. Con-
sequently, the FRLTA presumes abandonment when the tenant is ab-
sent for a period of one-half the time for periodic rent payments. For
most tenants, fifteen days absence will be sufficient. If, however, the
rent is current or the tenant has notified the landlord of an intended
absence, the presumption will not apply.
The tenant may also terminate the rental agreement for the land-
lord's material noncompliance with his obligation to maintain the
premises or with material provisions of the rental agreement."" When
the tenant terminates, he must move from the premises. If he moves,
he will not be liable for rent for the terminated portion of the rental
agreement, If he does not move, he will be subject to a suit for pos-
session and liable for accrued rent and damages.
A landlord's noncompliance that is due to causes beyond his con-
trol gives the tenant the right either to terminate or to alter the rental
agreement with the landlord's consent. 92 Though the FRLTA refers
to the rental agreement being "altered by the parties," contract doc-
trine requires that a novation based on consideration be executed. The
term "causes beyond the control of the landlord" should be interpreted
consistently with the contract doctrine of frustration. It should not be
confused with "casualty damage," which is provided for in another sec-
tion.1'0 If serious plumbing malfunction causes the tenant to serve
notice of intention to terminate and the landlord or his plumber is
unable to secure materials to make the repairs, frustration occurs. If,
in the example, the materials are acquired and the malfunction is re-
paired after expiration of the seven-day notice period, the tenant still
is entitled to terminate. Subsequent repair does not reinstate the ren-
tal agreement.
Waiver can prevent either party from having a right to terminate. 4
If the landlord accepts rent or other performance from the tenant, with
actual knowledge of the tenant's noncompliance, he waives the right to
terminate or sue for damages for the noncompliance. Vice versa, the
tenant may waive his right to terminate or sue for damages. A written
agreement that a party accepting performance with knowledge of a
noncompliance does not waive his rights as to the noncompliance is
sufficient to avoid waiver. But for the nonwaiver agreement to be effec-
tive, the party accepting performance should have actual knowledge
191. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56(1)).
192. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56(1)).
193. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.63).
194. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.56(5)). See, e.g., Moskos v. Hand, 247 So. 2d
795 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Tollius v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); MODEL CODE § 2-313; URLTA § 4.204.
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of the noncompliance at the time the agreement is entered into. Other-
wise, landlords would include nonwaiver clauses in their rental agree-
ments as a matter of course, making it impossible for them ever to
suffer waiver of their rights.
The tenant is permitted to terminate the rental agreement if the
premises are "damaged or destroyed other than by the wrongful or
negligent acts of the tenant."'195 The enjoyment of the premises must be
"substantially impaired," and the tenant must vacate the premises
immediately for rent liability to cease. Partial destruction will permit
the tenant to vacate the part of the premises destroyed and reduce his
rent in proportion to the amount of destruction. This section of the
FRLTA is designated "casualty damage" and is designed to provide
a remedy for the well-known "acts of God."
The question of when a noncompliance is sufficiently serious to jus-
tify termination of the rental agreement must be left for judicial in-
terpretation. The Law Revision Council chose the word "material"
with the intent that whatever definitions have already been given it
should be given weight in the future.196 The Council felt that the op-
tion of termination of the rental agreement should not lie except for
an important or substantial noncompliance. A noncompliance that is
not serious enough to be considered material is, however, not without
a remedy. The aggrieved party can bring an action in the nature of
specific performance or for damages. 197
It is open to question whether the parties may provide in a rental
agreement for termination for any noncompliance whether or not ma-
terial.9 5 The more sound position is that section 83.56 reflects an in-
tention that no termination may take place unless the noncompliance
is material. The question of materiality could be brought before the
court as a defensive matter by the party against whom the termination
was sought to be enforced in an action for possession.
B. Suit for Possession
1. Generally.-Landlords are entitled to the use of summary pro-
195. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.63).
196. See generally 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 946 (1951); Reynolds v. Armstead, 443
P.2d 990, 991 (Colo. 1968); Transportation Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Strandberg, 392 S.W.2d
319, 324 (Mo. 1965).
197. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§§ 83.54, 83.55).
198. A provision for termination for immaterial noncompliance could be considered
invalid under Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.47 (1) (a)), which prohibits the waiver
of rights on remedies granted under the FRLTA. It might also be unconscionable under
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.45).
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cedure 99 in actions for possession. If neither personal nor substi-
tuted service can be obtained, service of process by posting on the prem-
ises is permitted. 211 Service by posting on the premises differs, of course,
from the personal service ordinarily required to support an in personam
judgment in a conventional civil action.2 0 1 Accordingly, a landlord who
sues for possession using summary procedure and posted service should
not be permitted to get a judgment for accrued rent or other money
damages in the same action.20 2 The landlord should be required to
bring a separate suit for the rent or damages using conventional pro-
cedure and personal service.
2 3
When a judgment for money damages is sought in a summary
suit for possession, it should be denied even if personal service of proc-
ess is obtained. The use of summary procedure is permitted only when
"specified by statute or rule." 20 4 It is permitted in suits for possession
under the FRLTA2 0 5 but is not expressly permitted in suits for dam-
ages. 20 1 Consequently, summary procedure to recover a money judg-
ment in the suit for possession should not be permitted absent express
statutory authorization.
Though the FRLTA does not permit recovery of both a money
199. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.59 (2)) (permits landlord to use summary
procedure provided in FLA. STAT. § 51.011 (1971)).
200. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 4 (§ 48.183); see discussion at pp. 589-90 infra.
201. Service by posting on the premises is permitted because a suit for possession
is an action in rem that determines only the issue of possession. Actions that seek a
money judgment typically require personal service. Compare FLA. STAT. § 48.031 (1971)
(personal service) with FLA. STAT. § 49.011 (1971) (service by publication).
202. See Sprock v. James, 278 A.2d 421, 423 (N.J. 1971), in which the court said:
"The actions were simply for possession on the ground of nonpayment of rent. Brought
as they were under the summary dispossess statute, they were not actions for recovery of
the rent." See also Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); State ex
rel. Dorn v. Morley, 442 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1969). See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 82 (1971),
apparently permitting a money judgment in a summary unlawful detainer or forcible
entry action, though if obtained without personal or substitute service it would seem
to be open to attack on grounds of procedural due process.
203. Suits for damages are maintained under Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.55),
which provides: "If either the landlord or the tenant fails to comply with the require-
ments of the rental agreement or this part, the aggrieved party may recover the damages
caused by the noncompliance."
204. FLA. STAT. § 51.011 (1971).
205. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.59(2)).
206. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.55). See also Paregol v. Smith, 103 A.2d 576
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954), where the court permitted recovery of back rent in the suit
for possession but only because a statute expressly provided for it. Personal service was
of course required to support the money judgment. See also cases cited in note 202 supra.
The Florida Law Revision Council considered allowing claims for damages to be liti-
gated using summary procedure, but the idea was rejected. While speed is necessary in
the landlord's attempt to regain possession, it is not usually necessary in a suit for
money damages.
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judgment and possession in a summary suit, the same result can be
achieved by use of an unlawful detainer action °.2 7 The unlawful de-
tainer statutes contain an express authorization for the use of summary
procedure -20 8 and for the recovery of a money judgment. 209 Service of
process may be obtained by posting on the premises,21 0 but caution re-
quires that personal service be obtained whenever a money judgment
is sought. Otherwise the judgment would be open to attack on the
o ound that it violated procedural due process.-'
There is an attempt in the FRLTA to repeal unlawful detainer
actions "with regard to residential tenancies, ' '2 12 but the attempted re-
peal is probably unconstitutional. It, in effect, seeks to amend each of
the unlawful detainer sections to prohibit their application to resi-
dential tenancies. The Florida constitution requires that when a sta-
tute is amended it must be "published" in full along with the amend-
ment and not "revised or amended by reference to its title only."2 13 The
unlawful detainer sections were not "published" in the attempted re-
peal.
A landlord is entitled to service by publication2 14 when personal
service cannot be obtained and summary procedure2 15 for the enforce-
ment of his lien for rent. Whether enforcement of the lien can be ob-
tained in a suit for possession depends upon whether service in the
latter can be in lieu of service in the former. Though the question does
not appear to have been decided, if personal service is obtained for the
possession suit, it will probably be adequate service for the enforcement
of the lien permitting both objectives to be obtained in one summary
action. Service by posting on the premises, however, is not sufficient to
support enforcement of the lien, since it is not specifically authorized
by statute.
2. Payment into the Registry.-Under the FRLTA, when a land-
lord sues a tenant for possession and the tenant interposes any defense
other than payment of the rent, the tenant must pay into the registry
not only rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding but
207. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 82 (1971).
208. FLA. STAT. § 82.04 (1971).
209. FLA. STAT. §§ 82.05, 82.081 (2) (1971).
210. FLA. STAT. § 82.061 (1971).
211. See cases cited in note 202 supra.
212. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 13.
213. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6. See, eg., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Hillsborough County
Aviation Authority, 153 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1963) (construing FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 16
(1885), which is substantially similar to § 6 of the 1968 constitution).
214. FLA. STAT. § 49.011(1) (1971).
215. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 9 (§ 85.011 (5) (a)).
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also any rent accrued at the time of commencement of the suit.2"'
Whether a landlord obtains posted service or personal service, ordi-
narily only a judgment for possession can be rendered. If enforcement
of the statutory lien is sought in the same action, but the amount of
the back rent sought is less than the $1000 personal property exemp-
tion from the statutory lien, still only a judgment for possession can
be rendered. Therefore, in these and other circumstances in which the
landlord can get judgment only for possession, the requirement that
the tenant pay accrued rent into the registry is a penalty on the tenant's
right to defend because it requires to be paid an amount for which the
landlord could not obtain judgment in the suit for possession.
In Lindsey v. Normet,21 the United States Supreme Court found a
similar penalty to be a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The appellant attacked three provisions of
the Oregon statute, which required that: (1) the issue of possession
must be tried no later than six days after service of the complaint un-
less security for accruing rent is provided; (2) the tenant may not de-
fend on the basis of the landlord's breach of a duty to maintain the
premises (only the tenant's nonpayment is a triable issue); and (3) the
tenant must post a bond of twice the amount of rent expected to accrue
during pendency of an appeal, which bond is forfeited if the lower
court is affirmed. Both the first and second requirements were upheld.2 1 8
But the Court regarded the third requirement as a penalty and thus an
unconstitutional burden on the defendant's statutory right to appeal.
219
Lindsey was concerned only with the equal protection problem
of a penalty bond on the right of appeal. But the Court's reasoning
can be applied with even greater force to a penalty on the statutory
right to raise defenses in the initial trial.120 Consequently, the legisla-
ture should amend section 83.60 (2) to require the tenant to pay into
the registry only rent that accrues after commencement of the suit
for possession.
There is also a potential due process issue. Payment into the regis-
try is beneficial to the landlord because it assures him that rent will
be paid during the pendency of litigation, albeit to the court. The
pendency of litigation, even using the summary procedure for posses-
sion under the FRLTA, can be protracted. A jury trial can be had
for the asking. Material noncompliances with rental agreement or with
216. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.60(2)).
217. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 74-79. See also Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971); Williams v. Shaffer,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
220. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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building, housing or health codes are available defenses. While the
litigation continues, the tenant remains in possession and the landlord
is without rental income. The landlord may be unable to recover in
the suit for possession rent that accrues during the pendency. Thus to
assure the landlord that the tenant will pay the accruing rent right-
fully due, payment into the registry is necessary."' But while payment
into the registry is beneficial to the landlord, it is burdensome to the
tenant. First, it is uncommon in civil litigation that a plaintiff is ac-
corded the advance assurance of a defendant's solvency.22 2 Only pre-
judgment replevin, attachment and garnishment are possible excep-
tions, and these are surrounded with strict procedural protections
-
.
2 2
Secondly, to require that an indigent tenant pay accrued rent into the
registry of the court before being entitled to assert as a defense the
material noncompliance with the rental agreement or with building,
housing or health codes "has the effect of restricting access to and
participation in the judicial system. ' ' 224 Thirdly, it is anomalous that
a tenant who is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis should be re-
quired to make money payments before being permitted to assert some
defenses. 215
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co.,226 was faced with this seemingly
implacable conflict between landlord and tenant interests. There, low-
er courts had adopted under their equity powers the practice of re-
quiring the tenant's payment into the registry. After reviewing the
practice and the conflicting interests, the court concluded that "al-
though the court may, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction,
order that future rent be paid into the registry of the court as it be-
comes due during the pendency of the litigation, such prepayment
221. In Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court
was concerned with the practice of lower court judges in which the court's equity powers
were used to compel payment into the registry in suits for possession. It was found that
in view
of the emerging non-summary nature of the suit for possession, the concomitant
severe disadvantage in which the landlord has been placed during such litigation,
and the potential for dilatory tactics which judicial innovation in this area has
bred, we conclude that the prepayment of rent requirement as a method of pro-
tecting the landlord may be employed in limited fashion.
Id. at 482.
222. Id. at 479.
223. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment); FLA. STAT. §§ 76.04,
76.05 (1971) (prejudgment attachment requiring special circumstances). See also Fla. Laws
1973, ch. 73-20.
224. 430 F.2d at 480.
225. Id. at 479.
226. id.
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is not favored and should be ordered only in limited circumstances,
only on motion of the landlord, and only after notice and opportunity
for a hearing on such a motion. ' '227
The Florida Legislature would do well to adopt this flexible ap-
proach. Payment should be required when a tenant requests a jury
trial in addition to when he seeks to defend on the basis of a material
noncompliance with the rental agreement or with building, housing
or health codes. Either of these events could mean that litigation will
be protracted. After motion by the landlord and notice to the tenant,
the tenant and landlord should have the opportunity to show circum-
stances that might affect the court's order requiring payment into the
registry.
The Bell court said that a tenant should be required to pay into
the registry only when "the landlord has demonstrated an obvious need
for such protection," even though it appears from other factors that
the litigation will be protracted.2 18 Circumstances a court should con-
sider in determining whether there is a need are: "the amount of rent
alleged to be due, the number of months the landlord has not received
even a partial rental payment; the reasonableness of the rent for the
premises, . . . whether the tenant has been allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis, and whether the landlord faces a substantial threat of
foreclosure."229
Ordinarily, a tenant will be required to pay the reserved rent into
the registry. But circumstances may require a court to order a lesser
amount paid in. For example, if the tenant's pleadings make a strong
showing that the landlord is in material noncompliance with building,
housing or health codes or with the rental agreement, the court should
order a proportionately reduced amount paid in. If the tenant's indi-
gency seems likely to "preclude litigation of meritorious defenses," the
court should order paid in an amount sufficient to cover the landlord's
out-of-pocket periodic expenses but less than the reserved rent.2 3
Disbursement of the funds paid into the registry is not explained
in the FRLTA, but, again, the guidelines set out by the Bell court are
helpful. Because a judgment for money damages cannot be had in a
suit for possession under the FRLTA, it would be error to apply the
funds against rent that accrued prior to commencement of the litiga-
tion. But if the court finds an absence of material noncompliances,
then the registry funds should be applied against rent that accrued
227. Id.
228. Id. at 483-84.
229. Id. at 484.
230. Id. at 484-85.
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during pendency. This assumes that "the condition of the premises
during the period at issue continued unchanged throughout the liti-
gation period and that no substantial housing defects have come into
existence."231 If the court finds that material noncompliances by the
landlord abate all or a portion of the reserved rent, the funds should
be disbursed accordingly.
A tenant who abandons the premises prior to trial should recover
all of the registry funds because the landlord will have obtained the
possession he sought. A separate suit for a money judgment will be
needed if the landlord is to recover rent due during the period it was
paid into the registry.
The FRLTA specifies that payment into the registry shall continue
"during the pendency of the proceeding. '" 23 2 This period extends from
commencement to judgment with rent apportioned from day to day.231
When the tenant appeals from the lower court judgment, the require-
ment that a supersedeas bond be posted2 34 is sufficient to protect the
landlord; hence the funds in the registry can be retained by the court
pending outcome of the appeal. 235 Since appeal will operate as a "stay
or supersedeas upon posting bond, ' ' 236 then the tenant should be left in
possession and the landlord should be left with the registry funds in-
tact. Because supersedeas is simply a continuation of the landlord's
protection into the appellate stage, a "good and sufficient bond" should
be set in the same way as the amount to be paid into the registry."'
It would be a good practice to allow periodic payments for supersedeas
instead of a lump sum so as to accord with the registry scheme of the
trial court.
3. Service of Process.-Prior to 1945, service of process in actions for
possession was carried out in the same way as personal service of proc-
ess in any civil case.2 38 In that year the legislature added a provision
allowing the summons and complaint to be attached to the premises in-
volved in the proceeding if the defendant could not be found in the
county or if no person above the age of fifteen could be found at the
defendant's usual place of abode.239
Although this provision required that the defendant could not be
found in the county, not until Knight Manor # One, Inc. v. ].A. Free-
231. Id. at 485.
232. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.60(2)).
233. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330. § 2 (§ 83.46(1)).
234. FLA. App. R. 5.5.
235. Id. 5.2.
236. Id.
237. FLA. STAT. § 59.13 (1971).
238. FLA. STAT. § 48.031 (1971).
239. Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22731, § 1. This provision became FLA. STAT. § 83.22 (1971).
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man 4 0 was it interpreted to mean what it said. There, the process server
went to the defendant's home twice on the same day, a working day.
After finding no one at home, he posted the summons and complaint.
The court upheld the lower court's order quashing service and dismiss-
ing the case. Since this decision, many tenants have prevailed by argu-
ing that the summons and complaint were posted under improper cir-
cumstances.
The FRLTA provides that
[i]n an action for possession of residential premises under § 83.59, if
neither the tenant nor a person of the tenant's family 18 years of age
or older can be found at the usual place of residence of the tenant,
summons may be served by attaching a copy to a conspicuous place
on the property described in the complaint or summons.2 41
This significantly eases the requirements for giving the court jurisdic-
tion.242 The Law Revision Council recommended a requirement of
"diligent search and inquiry" at the residence of the tenant.243 This
was deleted on the floor of the Senate.244 The due process rights of the
tenant, however, will still require some effort beyond a single knock
on the door before posted notice will be adequate. Otherwise this sec-
tion will be subject to constitutional doubt.2 45
C. Landlord's Lien
Florida has long had statutory provisions giving the landlord a lien
240. 254 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971). See also Sussman v. Issac, 35 Fla.
Supp. 50 (Dade County Civ. Ct. Rec. 1971).
241. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 4 (§ 48.183). This is similar to the service of process
section for unlawful detainer in FLA. STAT. § 82.061 (1971).
242. The question of whether an action for possession of rental premises under FLA.
STAT. ch. 83 (1971) was an in personam or an in rem action has apparently never been
specifically decided.
243. COUNCIL REPORT 31.
244. FLA. S. JOUR. 726 (1973).
245. In McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), the Court stated: "To dispense
with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least
that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done."
The Court further stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950):
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.
Thus, to the extent that sheriffs, and the courts, do not read at least an equivalent of
the "diligent search and inquiry" requirement into this statute, it would probably be un-
constitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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upon the tenant's personal property for unpaid rent.24 These statutes
essentially reflected the common law.2 "47 The FRLTA contains a newly
worded landlord's lien section that applies to residential tenancies.2 48
The lien only takes effect for "accrued rent," which is the way the old
provision was interpreted.2 49 Like the old provision,2 0 the landlord's
lien is not self-executing but must be enforced through legal process.
Landlords' liens are exempt from the provisions of the UCC regarding
secured transactions.2 1 There has been confusion between innkeeper-
guest2 2 and landlord-tenant statutes. The problem arises when inn-
keeper-guest rights and remedies are applied to the landlord-tenant
relationship.2 53 The FRLTA amends the innkeeper-guest lien and in-
stant ejectment statutes25 4 to limit their applicability to "transient" oc-
cupancy.2 s Several of these statutes have recently been declared un-
constitutional to the extent that they were being applied to landlord-
tenant situations.256
The new landlord's lien provision is placed under Part II of chap-
246. FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1971); see 4 J. ADKINS, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRO-
cEDURE § 106.05 (1960); Anderson, Negotiating and Drafting Leases for the Landlord, 25
U. MIAMI L. REV. 361, 363-68 (1971). This statute applies to all property other than agri-
cultural products "usually kept" on the premises. FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (2) (1971). Subsection
(3) applies to all other property of the defendant. The new provision for residential lease-
holders applies only to property of the tenant "located on the premises." Fla. Laws 1973,
ch. 73-330, § 3 (§ 713.691).
247. See, e.g., Jones v. Fox, 2 So. 700 (Fla. 1887). See also City Bldg. Corp. v. Farish,
292 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1961).
248. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 3 (§ 713.691).
249. In re J.E. De Belle Co., 286 F. 699 (S.D. Fla. 1923). Thus, apparently, any prop-
erty taken off the premises prior to the accrual of the rent for which the lien is sought
will not be subject to the lien. See also FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (5) (b) (1971), as amended,
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 9.
250. Van Hoose v. Robbins, 165 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
251. FLA. STAT. § 679.104 (2) (1971).
252. The innkeeper-guest relationship is a wholly different relationship from the
landlord-tenant one and is surrounded by an entirely different set of rules. See Goodell v.
Morris Landsburgh & Associates, 77 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1955). See generally 17 FLA. JUR.
Hotels, Restaurants, and Motels §§ 22-28 (1958).
253. See discussion at p. 593 infra. One commentator has argued that these statutes
were in fact intended to cover the landlord-tenant relationship. Barnett, When the Land-
lord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L.
REV. 238, 253 nn.62 & 63 (1966).
254. FLA. STAT. § 509.141 (Supp. 1972), FLA. STAT. § 713.67-.69 (1971). Although FLA.
STAT. § 713.69 (1971) was not specifically amended, its applicability depends on FLA.
STAT. § 713.68 (1971), which was amended.
255. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, §§ 6-8.
256. See Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972). There is a good argument that the statutes that
create a possessory lien for the innkeeper without a due process hearing for the guest
are unconstitutional under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Hall v. Garson,
468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ter 713, Florida statutes, thus locating it with all the other statutory
liens. These liens are enforceable through the procedure set out in
chapter 85, Florida statutes, for enforcement of statutory liens. Thus,
the FRLTA provides a new procedure for enforcing the landlord's
lien to replace the statutory distress for rent procedure, 257 which has
been declared unconstitutional. 251 Section 85.011 (5), Florida statutes,
was amended to authorize the use of the summary procedure contained
in chapter 51, Florida statutes, for enforcement of landlords' liens.
2 5 9
Chapter 85 already includes a provision for injunction and attachment
in appropriate circumstances, when the lien has been perfected.260 The
FRLTA states that the remedy of distress for rent is abolished for resi-
dential tenancies 261 and codifies the one thousand dollar homestead
exemption from the landlord's lien.262
A major change in Florida law may now be that the landlord's lien
can be enforced in the same proceeding as the action for possession be-
cause both are under the summary procedure set forth in chapter 51,
Florida statutes. 263 It is arguable, however, that pursuit by the land-
lord of both an action for possession and an action to enforce the statu-
tory lien are inconsistent 264 and that he must elect one or the other.265
D. Self-Help Evictions
Self-help evictions by landlords, or evictions without resort to legal
process, have been a major problem in Florida landlord-tenant law2 66
257. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.09, 83.11-.19 (1971). An attorney general's opinion has already
suggested that the chapter 85 procedure could be used to enforce the landlord's lien. 1971
FLA. ATT'v GEN. Op. 071-152.
258. Stroemer v. Shevin, No. 72-1627 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 29, 1973), based upon Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
259. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 9.
260. FLA. STAT. § 85.031 (1) (1971).
261. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 3 (§ 713.691 (3)).
262. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 3 (§ 713.691(2)). See Schofield v. Lioday, 16 So.
780 (Fla. 1895); Hodges v. Cooksey, 15 So. 549 (Fla. 1894). See also Van Hoose v. Robbins,
165 So. 2d 209, 210 n.1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
263. This would reverse the effect of Van Hoose v. Robbins, 165 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964), which pointed out the necessity for a separate distress for rent pro-
ceeding to enforce the landlord's lien.
264. See, e.g., Weeke v. Reeve, 61 So. 749 (Fla. 1913).
265. A full discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this article. For an
analogous situation, see Voges v. Ward, 123 So. 785, 793 (Fla. 1929); National City Truck
Rental Co. v. Southern Mill Creek Prods. Co., 213 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (holding that repossession of trucks under conditional sales contract was an elec-
tion that precluded an action for back payments). See generally 11 FLA. JUR. Election of
Remedies §§ 10-12 (1957). But see p. 585 supra.
266. Barnett, supra note 253, at 238; Boyer & Grable, Reform of Landlord-Tenant
Statutes to Eliminate Self-Help in Evicting Tenants, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 800 (1968).
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as well as in other states. 67 Such action by the landlord gives rise to a
cause of action for damages.268 The general rule is: 26 9 "[A] landlord
otherwise entitled to possession must, on the refusal of the tenant to
surrender the leased premises, resort to the remedy given by law to se-
cure it; otherwise he would be liable in damages for using force or
deception to regain possession." The problem in Florida has been the
difficulty of determining what was the remedy given by law. This
stemmed partially from apparent inconsistency in landlord-tenant stat-
utes, 270 and also from ambiguous language in statutes originally in-
tended to give innkeepers the right to lock out or eject guests.2 7 1 The
FRLTA makes the statutory landlord remedies clear and exclusive 272
and amends the innkeeper-guest statutes to limit their applicability
to transient occupancy.2 73
267. E.g., Comment, Dispossession of a Tenant Without judicial Process, 76 DICK. L.
REv. 215 (1972).
268. Whether the eviction is wrongful is a question of fact. Rogers v. Parker, 241 So.
2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). See also Pizzi v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 250
So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1971). Punitive damages are recoverable if the eviction is malicious
and wanton. Young v. Cobbs, 83 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1955). The Law Revision Council
proposal prohibited punitive damages because of a philosophical aversion to such dam-
ages in any action. COUNCIL REPORT 20. This prohibition was reversed in the House Ju-
diciary Committee, which specifically authorized punitive damages. After a spirited de-
bate on the floor of the House, the section allowed punitive damages "if applicable." FLA.
H.R. JouR. 382-83 (1973). All reference to punitive damages was then removed by the
Senate Consumer Affairs Committee. FLA. S. JoUR. 723 (1973). Thus, after much debate
on the issue, the FRLTA contains no reference to punitive damages, and the law on this
subject should remain as it was.
269. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177, 186 (1966).
270. Compare FLA. STAT. § 83.05 (1971) with FLA. STAT. § 83.20(2) (1971); see Barnett,
supra note 253, at 259-61.
271. See FLA. STAT. § 509.141 (1971) (authorizing the removal of intoxicated, immoral
or profane guests). The applicability of this section to apartment houses has caused it to
be used by landlords as a justification for self-help evictions, thus bypassing the necessity
of judicial proceedings under FLA. STAT. ch. 83 (1971). See Kent v. Wood, 235 So. 2d 60
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); 1972 FLA. ATT'y GEN. Op. 072-134; 1973 FLA. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. 073-139; Pensacola News, Mar. 29, 1973, at 4A, col 3.
272. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 2 (§ 83.59 (3)), provides:
The landlord shall not recover possession of a dwelling unit except:
(a) in an action for possession under subsection (2) of this section, or other civil
action in which the issue of right of possession is determined;
(b) when the tenant has surrendered possession of the dwelling unit to the land-
lord; or
(c) when the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit. In the absence of actual
knowledge of abandonment, it shall be presumed that the tenant has abandoned
the dwelling unit if he is absent from the premises for a period of time equal to
one-half the time for periodic rental payments; provided, however, this presump-
tion shall not apply if the rent is current or the tenant has notified the landlord
of an intended absence.
273. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, §§ 6-8. FLA. STAT. § 509.141 (1971) was also amended
by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-325, § 8, but it is consistent with the limitation to transient
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The FRLTA eliminates self-help evictions for two reasons. First,
the issue of the right to possession is often in dispute; the tenant's
available remedies for unlawful eviction do not make up for the trauma
of a lock-out to a tenant and his family. Secondly, the maintenance of
the status quo (tenant remaining in possession) pending dispossession
of the tenant through judicial proceedings is generally less of a hard-
ship on the landlord than the maintenance of the status quo (tenant
remaining out of possession) pending the tenant's regaining the pos-
session of the premises through judicial proceedings.2 7 4
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is a sweeping
revision of legal principles that have been in effect for hundreds of
years. Not only are many of the principles changed, but they are now
governed by statutory provisions rather than common law. This article
highlights the important changes contained in the FRLTA and de-
scribes how these changes will fit into Florida's existing legal frame-
work.2 7 - With regard to many issues, at this point only questions can
occupancy. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-325, § 1 (§§ 509.012(9)-(10)), for definitions of
transient and transient occupancy.
274. Barnett, supra note 253, at 278-79.
275. There are several aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship that are not spe-
cifically covered by the FRLTA. For example, the FRLTA does not: (1) provide a statu-
tory form of lease to control when there is no written lease between the parties; (2) ad-
dress the issue of assignments and subleases; (3) contain a specific provision covering the
landlord's termination of utilities or other essential services as a technique of harassing
the tenant or forcing him to vacate the premises, see MODEL CODE § 2-207; URLTA
§§ 4.104, 4.107; and (4) contain a specific provision governing the situation in which
a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term with the permission, actual or im-
plied, of the landlord. See FLA. STAT. § 83.04 (1971).
The FRLTA contains no provision specifically requiring the mitigation of damages
upon the tenant's abandonment. It was stated in Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553, 557-58
(Fla. 1953), that upon the tenant's vacation of the premises prior to the expiration of the
lease, the landlord may elect to stand by and do nothing, holding the tenant liable for
the rent as it accrues. See also Diehl v. Gibbs, 173 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1965). Thus, Florida seems to follow the majority rule that the landlord has no duty to
mitigate damages upon the tenant's abandonment. For a discussion of the majority rule,
see Gruman v. Investor's Diversified Services, Inc., 78 N.2d 377, 380-81 (Minn. 1956);
55 MICH. L. REv. 1029 (1957). Contra, Wright v. Baumann, 398 P.2d 119 (Ore. 1965). Two
Florida cases, however, state in dicta that the doctrine of mitigation applies to leases as
well as to contracts. Young v. Cobbs, 110 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1959); Brewer v. Northgate
of Orlando, Inc., 143 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Both cases are perhaps
distinguishable: Brewer on the grounds that it applied to a contract to deliver possession
of leased premises, and Young on the grounds that it applied to an action to recover
damages for permanent improvements affixed to real property. Also, the two cases involved
a lessee's rather than a lessor's duty to mitigate.
Because the general legislative intent of the FRLTA is to abolish the outdated distinc-
tions between contracts and leases, the requirement that a landlord mitigate damages
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be raised. It is impossible even to guess at all of the ramifications and
possible interpretations of the FRLTA. The courts should look upon
the Act as remedial legislation and construe it liberally to effectuate
its purposes of modernizing landlord-tenant law and placing the land-
lord and the tenant on a more nearly equal level.
upon the tenant's abandonment should be implied in residential landlord-tenant cases.
Accord, MODEL CODE § 2-308(4); URLTA § 1.105.
As discussed previously, see pp. 577-79 supra, the FRLTA contains no provision
governing retaliatory conduct by the landlord. However, pursuant to the Florida
deceptive and unfair trade practices act, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-124, the Cabinet recently
adopted rules, authorized by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-124, § 1 (§ 50.1205), which specify
acts or practices which violate the act. Chapter 2-11 of those rules applies specifically
to rental housing and mobile home parks. The most important provision is § 2-11.07,
which specifies that retaliatory conduct by the landlord constitutes a violation of the
act. Thus a tenant who feels he is being retaliated against can either counterclaim or
file an action of his own seeking the remedies available under Fla. Laws 1973, ch.
73-124. A copy of the rules is available from the Office of the Attorney General, The
Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida.
In addition, a county court has recently held that retaliatory eviction is a viola-
tion of the legislative intent behind local housing codes, and against public policy.
Lifschitz v. Blakely, No. 73-12166 (Broward Co. Ct., Dec. 21, 1973).
On the other hand, Fla. Stat. § 83.271 (1971), discussed in footnote 104 supra, is
currently under attack in the Florida Supreme Court, as a deprivation of the landlord's
property without due process. Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, No. 44,179.
(filed Aug. 3, 1973).
